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Abstract Dislike among European publics for the Islamic
full veil and the desire to ban it are often ascribed to nativist
"Islamophobia." This article questions that assumption. It
argues that, in political terms, the wearing of the burqa and
niqab is inconsistent with Western norms of equality, the
backbone of the citizenship ideal; and that, in social terms,
the full veil erects a partition to interpersonal understanding
and reciprocity. While the constitutional duty to protect reli-
gious freedom is a good argument in favor of tolerating the
full veil, the practice of wearing it is at the edge of solidarity
and injurious to the democratic public sphere.
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What light can social and political theory throw on opposition
to Muslim female full-face covering—wearing of the burqua
and niqab—in European societies? Many explain hostility to
the full veil as evidence of confused thinking, prejudice and,
specifically, the fear and loathing of Muslims that goes by the
name Islamophobia. Had 9/11 and other terror acts perpetrated
by Muslims never occurred, they say, hostility to Islamic garb
would be an obsession of the few. Immigration, in a period of
deepening economic austerity, intensifies discrimination. These
accounts have merit. They recognize that bigotry is a recurrent
feature of the human condition. They also imply a principled
stand against intolerance. Yet, as sociological explanations,
they are inadequate and certainly incomplete. Exploring
pertinent coordinates of Western citizenship and social solidar-
ity, we offer a different explanation to those most current.
Western discomfiture towards full-face covering is culturally
explicable; it expresses the symbolic importance of the face to
Western notions of politics and the face’s centrality to social
interaction. Occlusion of face and the segmentation of bodily
presence, typical of women in tribal societies, conflict with
Western ideas of universal reciprocity and social solidarity. It
is this divergence, rather than Islamophobia, that provides the
most cogent framework to understand public attitudes to the
burqa and niqab in European countries.
The Problem of the Veil
According to a PewGlobalAttitudes Survey conducted between
April 7th and May 8th 2010, the majority of citizens in France,
Germany, Britain, and Spain approve of banning veils that cover
the whole face.1 Subsequently, France and Belgium have imple-
mented national laws that ban the full veil in public places.
Municipal bans are sprinkled across Europe as a whole.2
Many commentators, observing public alarm in Europe,
respond with disquiet of their own. The full-face veil, they say,
is symbolic of diversity, proof of the capacity of Western socie-
ties to absorb difference and to accept foreign customs. Societies
are enriched by cultural variation. Just as the presence of many
political interests is a sign of a healthy democracy, so the
existence of heterogeneous group customs is a sign of pluralism
more generally, and pluralism is one of the hallowed values of
Western liberalism. Such commentators often go on to conclude
that native anxiety about the full-face veil is eithermisplaced and
1 http://pewglobal.org/2010/07/08/widespread-support-for-banning-full-
islamic-veil-in-western-europe/
2 For a survey of current laws banning full veils, see “Le port de la
burqa dans les lieux publics,” Étude de legislation comparée, no. 201,
octobre, 2009, published by the French Senate: http://www.senat.fr/lc/
lc201/lc201_mono.html. See also “Italy Approves Draft Law to Ban
Burqa,” Manchester Guardian, August 2, 2011.
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a matter of simple ignorance, or, far worse, evidence of rampant
Islamophobia. The obvious remedy is not to ban the burqa and
niqab (henceforth N/B) but to enlighten the ignorant. Puncturing
double standards is a good place to start. The American philos-
opher Martha Nussbaum puts it this way:
It gets very cold in Chicago—as, indeed, in many parts of
Europe. Along the streets wewalk, hats pulled down over
ears and brows, scarves wound tightly around noses and
mouths. No problem of either transparency or security is
thought to exist, nor are we forbidden to enter public
buildings so insulated. Moreover, many beloved and
trusted professionals cover their faces all year round:
surgeons, dentists, (American) football players, skiers
and skaters. What inspires fear and mistrust in Europe,
clearly, is not covering per se, but Muslim covering.3
These analogies fail. Pulling a scarf over one’s mouth in the
dead of winter is an expedient to deal with a temporary situation.
Once one is in the company of others inside a building, how-
ever, the scarf or hat is removed. The same is true for champion
skiers or football players who are interviewed after their com-
petition and who relish public attention. Dentists and surgeons
wear masks for reasons of hygiene that are deemed beneficial to
professional and client alike. In contrast, the N/B is not a remedy
for a particular occasion; it is a permanent social impediment in
all four seasons. And far from having beneficial reciprocity in
mind it is a stark expression of separateness.
Nussbaum’s views are typical of those who believe that the
full-face veil is not a problem in its own right. If the problem
bears no rational relationship to the N/B itself, then it follows
that the real problem is in the eye of the beholder. That is in
good measure true, as we will show, but not for the reason
Nussbaum adduces: the fear that often goes by the name Islam-
ophobia. Sociologists, of all people, should be skeptical of this
question begging term. Is Durkheim forgotten? Do we intend,
in all seriousness, to explain social currents in terms of individ-
ual or aggregate phobias? Doubtless, some people view the N/
B as an emblem of unwelcome immigration. Doubtless, some
people fear Muslims for no good reason. But other people—
including some leaders of international human rights organiza-
tions; some leftist and green politicians; and some prominent
Muslim intellectuals—share none of these attributes yet still
favor banning full veils. Thosewho spoke in 2010 to the French
National Assembly’s Information Committee on the burqa in
favor of a ban included (ANRI 2010):
– Sihem Habchi, the president of Ni putes ni soumises
(Neither Whores Nor Submissives, a feminist organiza-
tion founded in 2002)
– Abdennour Bidar, a philosopher and commentator on
the Koran
– André Gerin, a member of the French Communist Party
– Patrick Gaubert, the president of the Ligue internatio-
nale contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme (International
League Against Racism and Antisemitism)
Nussbaum also believes, as many do, that N/B-wearing is at
root a matter of conscience, a right that demands protection.
But conscience cannot be assumed to be the universal motive
or defense of covering. Muslim women cover for many rea-
sons: piety, pride, tradition, political ideology, and family pres-
sure. Oppositional excitement is another factor. As one of Eva
Chi’s Tunisian subjects confided, “the forbidden is desirable,
and the more the government controls the veil, the more it is
tempting to challenge it” (2010: 44). Besides, in many societies
and sub-societies, failure to cover is a mode of deviance that
can be and is severely punished. The same is true sometimes
even in the West, where in the most dramatic cases facial
exposure, the wearing of make up, and the dating of Western
boys has culminated in planned, orchestrated murder by the
shamed family, so called “honor killing” (Chesler 2009, 2010;
Husseini 2009; Wikan 2008). One only has to observe women
—Muslim and infidel both—on international flights to Tehran,
Kabul or Karachi donning scarves on entry, and removing them
on exit, to appreciate the full weight of customary expectations
in covering practices.
Nussbaum, to be sure, deplores pressures on women to
conform. She simply wishes that women who choose to veil
be left alone to do so in peace and dignity. Yet her sympathy
towards traditional practices is one sided. Privileging the con-
science of the covered over established Western norms places
the whole burden of adaptation on to the host population. It
shifts the requirement to respect tradition on to everyone but the
N/B wearer. Western conventions of clothing and salutation can
be ignored as superficial or coercive. It also bears emphasis that
post-colonial writers (Nussbaum is not among them), who see
theWest as “an imaginary formation” (Al-Saji 2010: 878), fail to
note a telling irony of their position: that the fiercest fighters for
colonial liberation were adamant about the “uniqueness,” “na-
tional originality,” and “national vocation” of their own cultures.
“Cultural destruction”was an evil to be resisted. Local traditions
were at the heart of national identity. Anti-colonial radicals,
unlike their post-colonial successors, were no cultural
relativists.4
This article seeks to identify features of N/B antipathy that
polemics and special pleading routinely obscure. Two dimen-
sions are paramount. Politically, N/B wearing is by Western
standards an uncitizenly posture that undermines the twin prac-
tices of civic equality and reciprocity. Sociologically, N/B wear-
ing impedes cross-cultural understanding, social interaction and,
a fortiori, social solidarity beyond the domestic unit. Together
these political and sociological features suggest that the N/B,
3 http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/veiled-threats/
4 The terms in quotation marks come from Frantz Fanon’s powerful
essay, “Algeria Unveiled” ([1959] 1965: 161, 165-7, 173, 184).
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whatever the various intentions of its wearer—religious devo-
tion, identity statement, life-style choice, generational revolt—
marks a person as a political and social outsider within aWestern
environment.
Three caveats preface the argument advanced below. First,
our focus on the N/B is exclusively on its public appearance on
the street, in public buildings such as schools, hospitals and
offices, in parliaments and so forth. The garb is typically re-
moved in domestic, familial settings. Second, we say nothing of
substance about the hijab (headscarf) or the Iranian chador, both
of which reveal the face without serious impediment. In France
and Belgium, the issue of the full veil has been formulated as a
problem separate from the problem of the headscarf. Speaking
to the French National Assembly (ANRI: 592), the sociologist
Nilüfer Göle, whose book The Forbidden Modern (1997) eli-
cited sympathy for the headscarf, described the full veil con-
trastingly as “a regression or, at least, a very radical will to
rupture with reciprocity and exchange.”
The third caveat is that our comments refer exclusively to
N/B wearing in Western societies where it is an unorthodox
attire confronting folkways and sentiments different from
those in, notably, the Middle East. There, and in Western
enclaves where Middle Eastern people are in the majority,
matters are entirely different; the N/B is an accustomed
presence of everyday life. As such it mostly prompts no
comment or curiosity. In its native milieu, full-face covering
is acknowledged but little noticed, whereas discarding it
would drastically increase the visibility of the woman who
did so. Vision, as we now turn to see, is influenced by
powerful cultural traditions.5
Citizenship and Vision
Citizenship in Western democratic regimes is based on ideals
of equality.6 Whereas other spheres of life are particularistic,
asymmetric or exclusive—the family of which one is a mem-
ber, religious confession, how much money one makes, how
good looking, clever, socially adept or athletic one is, and so
forth—modern citizenship confers on adults in a political
jurisdiction the same rights (for instance, to vote) and obliga-
tions (such as tax payment) irrespective of rank, class, gender,
religion, ethnicity and family (Weber [1917] 1994: 105).7 To
be sure, the prerequisites of citizenship in Western societies
are heterogeneous (Brubaker 1992; Caldwell 2009: 148–154).
And it is evident that many people who reside in a country,
such as immigrants, are not afforded full political protection
and rights of participation. Our concern in the present argu-
ment, however, is mainly with the norm of equality as a
conceptual basis of citizenship. That this is an idealized pic-
ture of the modern constitutional polity need not detain us so
long as the aspirational link between equality and democratic
citizenship is accepted. Idealization is, in any case, an impor-
tant part of citizenship; it enables citizens to demand that states
lives up to their ideals.
More immediately pertinent is that citizenship equality is,
in fundamental ways, integrally related in Western traditions
to citizens being visible to one another. This expectation is
registered in theories of moral judgment (consider the role
played by the “spectator” in Adam Smith and Kant’s theo-
ries of judgment) and in some of our most potent democratic
terms and metaphors: enlightenment, openness, transparen-
cy, illumination, recognition, social legibility, accountabili-
ty, “publicity” and, not least, public, to which we return in
the next paragraph. The echo of biblical revelation and
ancient Greek thought in these notions is audible. For the
eighteenth century philosophes, enlightenment substituted
Holy Writ with “the great book of nature, open for all
mankind to read.” The heavenly city of the philosophes
was a City of Light surpassing in its rational luminosity
even the splendor of the Sun King (Becker ([1932] 1964:
51, 105-6) 105-6). Negating these images are opacity, the
Dark Ages, the dark arts, dark times, heart of darkness, arti-
fice, living in the closet, a shadowy realm, a troglodyte world
(Paul Fussell’s depiction ofWorldWar I trench warfare), cave-
like illusion, Stygian gloom, moral blindness, the id, conceal-
ment, inscrutability, subterfuge, murkiness, obscurantism, and
backroom deals—notions which imply various states of igno-
rance, menace and deceit. In sharp contrast, liberals trumpet
the virtue of the Open Society and liberalized Marxists ideal-
ize the translucent speech-situation. Socialists and radicals
extol debunking, the heir of Rousseau’s ([1750] 1993:7) cru-
sade to remove the “deceitful veil of politeness” which con-
ceals “fear, coldness, reserve, hate, and fraud”. True,
prominent French intellectuals of the last century sought to
demote vision’s status in the pantheon of sensibility (Jay
1994), while conservatives still remain attached to the “decent
drapery of life” (Burke [1790] 1999: 171). Yet these perspec-
tives have done little to impede the centrality of seeing within
the Western, Apollonian political aesthetic.
Invented in the ancient Greek world, the concept of
“public” has assumed since its birth a host of connotations:
common property and the common good; a realm in which
free and equal men are able to deliberate on and decide
political affairs; a place of discourse rather than labor; the
primacy of law over arbitrary rule; a domain in which the
ruler is considered to be a kind of custodian or guardian of
the commonweal rather than a seigneur or lord; a region in
which citizens may find distinction and glory; an area
5 The classic discussion is Merleau-Ponty (1945) 1962. On “racial-
ized” vision and the full-veil, see the discussion of al-Saji 2010.
6 On the centrality of equality and reciprocity to Western notions of
citizenship, see Bellamy 2008: 16, 59, 70, 104, 114.
7 The few exceptions to this—for instance “status” Indians in Canada
who do not pay tax on reservations—we leave in abeyance to concen-
trate on the overall picture.
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accessible to the many; a vehicle of composite opinion; a
community pursuing a joint purpose (Habermas [1962]
1999: 1–14; Oakeshott 1975: 149, 207, 218.) Each of these
meanings has, in turn, taken on its own inflections; for
instance, Robert Nisbet’s (1982: 249–50) distinction be-
tween public opinion (“the sturdy filter of long-shared val-
ues and traditions”) and popular opinion (the transient froth
of mood and fashion). Of special relevance for our enquiry
is that by the mid-sixteenth century, public added to its
modern meanings the sense of activities and events that
are “manifest and open to general observation” (Sennett
[1974] 1992: 16). In the public sphere, unlike domesticity,
we demand to see what is going on, we expect honest
dealing, disclosure; hiding is an affront to that stipulation.
Hannah Arendt (1958: 50–3) claimed that the word pub-
lic evokes two “interrelated phenomena”. First:
everything that appears in public can be seen and
heard by everybody and has the widest possible pub-
licity. For us, appearance—something that is being
seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves—
constitutes reality. Compared with the reality which
comes from being seen and heard, even the greatest
forces of intimate life—the passions of the heart, the
thoughts of the mind, the delights of the senses—lead
an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless and
until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindivi-
dualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public
appearance…The presence of others who see what we
see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of
the world and ourselves…
The second referent of public is “the world itself, in so far
as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our
privately owned place in it.” The world, in Arendt’s usage,
comprises not the terrestrial globe or earth on which we
stand and from which we derive our physical sustenance,
but the sphere of created things that join and separate us, the
sphere of human “affairs which go on among those who
inhabit the man-made world together.”
This formulation suggests what is discordant about the N/
B’s existence in the Western political space. While for its
bearer the N/B may be understood as a badge of tradition
and piety, from the standpoint of a constitutional pluralist
citizenry it is a mode of concealment incompatible with
public recognition in which visibility of face is central.
The N/B denudes facial and, to a degree, vocal recognition,
debilities to which we shall return in a more sociological
context later. It standardizes human features and hence con-
tributes to the very stereotyping that N/B wearers them-
selves deplore. Faces and voices are all different, evidence
of human plurality. The N/B literally effaces these varia-
tions, with the partial exception of the eyes that may some-
times be seen. The N/B also symbolically ruptures the bond
of citizenship reciprocity because while its wearer can see
her real or potential interlocutor, can take advantage of the
visibility of others, non-wearers are denied such access. The
integral importance of reciprocity to “public reason” and, its
corollary, deliberative democracy, is a leitmotif of John
Rawls’s later work. Rawls says that the role “of the criterion
of reciprocity…is to specify the nature of the political rela-
tion in a constitutional democratic regime as one of civic
friendship” (Rawls 1999: 137). In Arendtian terms, N/B
apparel is an obstruction to “appearance”—“something that
is seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible
publicity.”
To this line of reasoning at least four objections can be
anticipated. N/B-clad persons, it might be protested, do
appear in public; they simply appear in a different way to
those uncovered. That is true. Indeed one might add that
concealment of the face and other parts of the body is by no
means the same as general inconspicuousness. On the con-
trary, in Western societies the N/B wearer is more eye-
catching than the non-wearer of it, more subject to the stare
or, conversely, more prone to evoke the embarrassment that
greets attire that is deemed bizarre or inappropriate. Some
(notably Al-Saji 2010: 886), sympathetic to veiling, claim
that it is Western attitudes themselves that are responsible
for a bizarre combination of the seen and the unseen. Hence
“while the veil is hypervisible as an oppressive and repres-
sive barrier [according to its critics], Muslim women ‘be-
hind the veil’ are not merely invisible to the western gaze,
but are made invisible as subjects” by not being respected.
Yet uncitizenly comportment is not about appearance as
such. It is about a precise type of appearance that, conceal-
ing the face, impedes mutual openness and repels interaction
as equals. Frantz Fanon ([1959] 1965: 169), describing what
he called the “phenomenology of encounters” between the
colonized veiled woman and the colonist, amplifies the
point:
The woman who sees without being seen frustrates the
colonizer. There is no reciprocity. She does not yield
herself, does not give herself, does not offer herself.
The Algerian has an attitude toward the Algerian
woman which is on the whole clear. He does not see
her. There is even a permanent intention not to per-
ceive the feminine profile, not to pay attention to
women… [In contrast, the] European faced with an
Algerian woman wants to see.
Fanon cheered on this lack of reciprocity, enjoying the
aggravation it caused the powerful. The colonized woman
seeks to frustrate the will of the colonial man. That is not our
current situation. The colonial was an interloper, unwelcome
in a foreign land, bending and breaking customs so that his
will be done. Today, in Western societies, Muslim citizens
are afforded equal rights in law, which is to say they are
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accorded the same rights as non-Muslims. Yet one group
still veils while another is visible. Denial of reciprocity to
occupiers of colonial societies is extended to citizens of
post-colonial ones.
A second objection to the argument that hiding the face is
uncitizenly might run as follows. Users of the Internet are
often obscured from view and no one assumes that their
being invisible is uncitizenly. Indeed, under some defini-
tions of politics, the internet might be considered the quin-
tessentially modern medium of political life: informing the
public of political events, orchestrating voting, requesting or
inciting people to participate in demonstrations, directing
attention to abuses of rule, mobilizing citizens for collective
action. Search engines like Google ever more assume tradi-
tional government functions. Its engineers claim that the
company’s predictions of flu epidemics and employment
trends are already more accurate than those of the Centers
for Disease Control and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Better predictions of “crime, terrorism and political unrest”
may be in the offing, prompting one journalist to predict in
turn that the “line between Google and government is des-
tined to blur.”8 Even so, the political effectiveness of the
Internet, especially in comparison with face-to-face encoun-
ters, is more dubious, or at least more complex, than it first
appears. To those who claim that digital networks act “as a
massive positive supply shock to the cost and spread of
information, to the ease and range of public speech by
citizens, and to the speed and scale of group coordination”
(Shirky 2011: 154), others reply with considerable skepti-
cism. The above statement may be true, they say, but “weak
ties” rarely lead to “high-risk activism.” The latter entails
not only personal contact and hard graft in actually building
a movement but also organizational hierarchy, even in the
most democratic initiatives. Loose networks are no substi-
tute for the “precision and discipline” afforded by such
centralized groups as the NAACP during the civil rights’
struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. “Facebook activism suc-
ceeds not by motivating people to make a real sacrifice but
by motivating them to do the things that people do when
they are not motivated enough to make a real sacrifice”—for
instance, giving on average nine cents a piece to the Face-
book Save Darfur Coalition (Gladwell 2010: 1–6). This
important debate is not, however, central to the N/B issues
raised here and for a plain reason. In Western societies the
Internet is an ancillary to public display not a substitute for
it, a tool to expand communication, rather than an obstacle
to constrict it. Computer webcams are employed between
interactants and in web chat rooms; interviews of foreign job
applicants conducted via Skype grow daily in popularity.
And it is no coincidence that the world’s most prominent
social networking site is called Facebook. Moreover, where
Internet use takes place without face recognition (as with
email or instant messaging) it typically does so reciprocally:
both users are in the same position and hence issues of
visibility imbalance and citizen asymmetry do not arise.
A third objection to the claim that N/B attire in public
places is uncitizenly turns the tables on the authors: it draws
on the Graeco-Roman tradition itself, the origins of Western
notions of citizenship. In that tradition, being a public per-
son was considered a kind of theatricality in which an agent
adopts a persona, a mask. Hobbes ([1651] 1996: 111-2),
before noting that “Persona in Latine signifies the disguise,
or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the
Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which
disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Vizard,” observed:
A Person, is he, whose words or actions are consid-
ered, either as his own, or as representing the words
or actions of an other man, or of any other things to
whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.
When they are considered as his owne, then he is
called a Naturall Person. And when they are consid-
ered as representing the words and actions of an other,
then he is a Feigned or Artificiall person (Hobbes’s
emphasis)
The persona was and is, however, a metaphorical mask,
not one of cloth. In Hobbes’ political theory, it was a means
of expanding modes of public representation whereas the N/
B is a symbol of religious belonging and, in French par-
lance, a claustral “folding in” (repli communautaire) or a
“closing off” (enfermement) (Bowen 2007: 156. 177). In
antiquity, the function of persona was not to conceal public
visibility but precisely to do the opposite: to shine the light
of the polis on the political actor, to dramatize the fact that
the individual had entered the public stage and that, as such,
had left the private world of intimacy so as to consort freely
with his peers and deliberate on political affairs. The polit-
ical persona was, then, an addition to, or rather a rupture
with, private life, not a replication or extension of it, a
vehicle of distinction, not a mantle contrived to expunge from
public view the unique personality of the woman beneath its
folds.9 Politics, in Western traditions, entails a split within the
being that engages in it, the construction of a second self: as an
equal of others who are familial strangers bound together by
the common tie of citizenship; a self able to cooperate with
these strangers, to “see” things from multiple points of view
and be seen seeing. More generally, the Western political
tradition is notable for its pronounced binary structure: oikos
and polis, dominium and res publica, lordship and office,
king and crown, natural persons and artificial persons8 Christopher Caldwell, “Government by search engine,” Financial
Times, Oct. 15, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a62be1dc-d897-
11df-8e05-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1K1HBRFpp 9 Arendt 1963: 106-9.
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(Louglin 2003: 6, 21, 45, 55-7, 76-9). Superimposed on
these bifurcations are other contrasts that impute to
religion, and religious institutions, a separate sphere of
engagement to that of the political: God and Caesar,
piety and justice, sacerdotium and regnum, church and
state, soul and city, revelation and reason, sin and crime
(Scruton 2003:1–6, 23, 134–139).
The NB, however, is not a fictive mask designed to open
up its wearer to the public recognition of peers acting in
concert or in conflict; it is a carapace projected into the
public space, a material mask that signals exclusivity, an
emblem of segmental occlusion, of what Durkheim ([1893]
1997: 128), discussing the primacy of resemblance in tribal
societies, called the politico-familial. As a badge of simili-
tude, the N/B smacks of mechanical solidarity. Nor is the N/
B artificial or dualistic. On the contrary, it signifies Sharia’s
total claim on the individual in all her activities, the type of
claim that the public-private distinction expressly repudi-
ates. It transpires that the classical concept of the mask and
the N/B have nothing substantively in common.
Finally, it might be objected that our argument about the
uncitizenly nature of the N/B rests on an unduly restrictive
notion of citizenship. After all, the meaning and practice of
citizenship has expanded greatly over the past two centuries.
Citizenship today involves social and cultural dimensions,
not simply political and juridical ones. It straddles a wide
array of contents, types, conditions and arrangements
(Susen 2010). That being the case it is strained to place, as
this article does, such a burden on the political idea of
equality and reciprocity to the exclusion of all other citizen-
ship elements.
Yet while a political community of equals, obligated to
one another, is no longer a sufficient aspect of citizenship in
the West, it is nonetheless a necessary aspect of it. More-
over, an inflationary conception of citizenship is not without
major problems or incongruities, as a number of theorists
recognize. Simon Susen (op. cit.: 273), for instance, insists
that the “extension of civil, political and social citizenship to
a potentially infinite number of different forms …leads to
the relativistic impoverishment” of “contemporary accounts
of the political”. For if any social group can claim citizen-
ship on the basis of its own definition, the concept degen-
erates into a “mere identity game”. Richard Bellamy (2008:
51, 98-9) agrees. Citizenship, he says, is ever more defined
as a series of global human rights. And these putative rights
are constantly growing. A survey conducted by the polling
organization GlobeScan for the BBC, on a population of
27,000 adults in 26 countries, found that four in five
respondents believe that internet access is a “fundamental
right.”10 The “absence of a political dimension,” however,
suggests a “somewhat second-rate account of what being a
citizen involves”. And why is that? Because the “idea of a
political community of equals … lies at the heart of citizen-
ship.” Bellamy (2008:114) also remarks that “citizenship
involves a degree of solidarity and reciprocity between
citizens” and that such citizens “need to see each other as
equal partners within a collective enterprise.” If that is true,
the N/B is a negation of citizenship. Disguising the face, and
avoiding contact with the kafir, disables citizens from “see-
ing” each other as free and equal partners.
Social Interaction and Social Solidarity
We have been discussing the ways in which N/B effacement
breeches norms of political equality and reciprocity, the
backbone of the citizenship ideal. N/B wearing is further
accompanied by a social impairment: the partition it erects
to interpersonal understanding and solidarity. Making sense
of the conduct of others in face-to-face, real-time encounters
requires us to pay attention to more than disembodied
words. Unlike reading a book, which is a cognitive, reflec-
tive endeavor, albeit informed by past experience and
learned competences, inter-personal understanding draws
on immediate, spontaneous and practical aspects of the
interaction-situation itself. These aspects are both cognitive
and somatic: emotional signals emitted by the face, the
voice, and the body in general. As Erving Goffman
(1963:34–5) remarks, “bodily idiom … is a conventional-
ized discourse. We must see that it is, in addition, a norma-
tive one.” He adds ([1955] 1967: 33):
During direct personal contacts…unique information-
al conditions prevail and the significance of face
becomes especially clear. The human tendency to use
signs and symbols means that evidence of social worth
and of mutual evaluations will be conveyed by very
minor things, and these things will be witnessed, as
will the fact that they have been witnessed. An un-
guarded glance, a momentary change in tone of voice,
an ecological position taken or not taken, can drench a
talk with judgmental significance.
Humans in their social transactions, Goffman reminds us,
are constantly engaged in “face work,” a semiotic traffic in
which proper deference is given and where the appropriate
demeanor is supposed to be maintained. “Good” demeanor
“is what is required of an actor if he is to be transformed into
someone who can be relied upon to maintain himself as an
interactant, poised for communication and to act so that
others do not endanger themselves by presenting themselves
as interactants to him” (ibid: 77).
Probably the single most important sign-vehicle that
humans possess, the chief corporeal building block of
10 The GlobeScan survey results were released in March 2010 http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8548190.stm
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solidarity in situational encounters, is the face. People who
look away when we are talking to them, scanning the
perimeter, are apparently preoccupied with other matters;
they are indicating a kind of inattentiveness that, in our
culture, translates to distraction or rudeness. Our response
to their alienation is alienation of our own. More generally,
signals of emotions—such as sadness, anger, surprise, fear,
disgust, contempt, and happiness—have facial correlates
that convey various kinds of information about their bear-
er.11 What makes people angry, for instance, differs to some
degree among persons and cultures; but the looks of anger
are universal, and spontaneously understood, part of our
evolutionary hard wiring and manifested in muscular move-
ments that differ both in intensity (ranging from irritation to
fury) and type (sullen anger, resentful anger, indignant anger
and cold anger) (Ekman 2003: 58). Even when we seek to
manage or hide our emotions, it is common for them to leak
out through facial signs, bodily gestures and tone, volume
and pitch of voice. Accordingly people who look at us can,
with a fair bit of reliability, tell how we are feeling unless we
suppress our expressions (ibid: 54–55) or hide them as the
N/B does. (Botox and other similar treatments, by giving the
face a stony and shiny appearance, also reduce expressive
capacity and viewer reception.) Even if we can see the eyes
of the facially covered, as with the niqab, we may not be
able to see the frame that gives their glance meaning: the
forehead, the eyebrows, the mouth and the cheeks that, in
various combinations of muscular movement or fixity, im-
part emotional information to the viewer.
When people have difficulty understanding one another,
this does not mean that fellow feeling between them is
impossible. Non-Muslims, or the habitually uncovered in
any society, are likely to feel sympathy for the woman in a
crowded airport whose outfit must, in many circumstances,
make her hotter, more confined and generally more uncom-
fortable than she would otherwise be divested of a niqab. Or
so we are inclined to think. The truth is that we do not know
for sure and, out of a sense of propriety, would not wish to
enquire. Adam Smith notes that much of our sympathy for
others is not an accurate reflection of how they feel but how
we imagine we would feel if we shared their situation. To
illustrate this point, he ([1759] 1976: 12–13) gives a con-
soling example:
We sympathize even with the dead, and overlooking
what is of real importance in their situation, that awful
futurity which awaits them, we are chiefly affected by
those circumstances which strike our senses, but can
have no influence on their happiness. It is miserable,
we think, to be deprived of the light of the sun; to be
shut out of life and conversation; to be laid in the cold
grave, a prey to corruption and the reptiles of the earth;
to be no more thought of in this world, but to be
obliterated, in a little time, from the affections, and
almost from the memory, of their dearest friends and
relations…. The happiness of the dead, however, most
assuredly, is affected by none of these circumstances;
nor is the thought of these things which can never
disturb the profound security of their repose.
Time and again, Smith reminds us that moral imagination
is mediated by vision: seeing, gazing, looking on, looking
upon, (his words) objects that, thereby, excites us to feel
compassion, revulsion and a host of other emotions. The
connection, he says, between the way we feel about a
person’s plight, and that person’s situation, is our witnessing
the former, and our “foresight” (again Smith’s term) into the
implications of the latter. It follows that our ability to judge
with confidence a person’s situation is greatly limited if our
seeing, gazing, looking on and looking upon, let alone our
foresight, is obstructed. Whether Georg Simmel recalled
Smith’s comments on this matter is unknown. But he offers
an intriguing gloss on them in the remark that of “the special
sense-organs the eye has a uniquely sociological function.
The union and interaction of individuals is based upon
mutual glances. This is perhaps the most direct and purest
reciprocity which exists anywhere.”12
To return to our example of the N/B clad woman in the
crowded airport: sympathy may turn to pity and indignation
on her behalf if we believe that her dress is a sign of
oppression. Or we may feel incredulity and confusion.
When people “turn off” their emotional lights, they appear
blank and lifeless. Covering the face turns off emotional
lights in the most direct and comprehensive way imaginable.
Its consequences for fellow feeling and the interaction it
enables in Western societies are significant. To understand
with greater precision why this is so, it is useful to identify
three kinds of attachment among strangers: political solidar-
ity, social sympathy, and social solidarity. These modes are
ideal-types that in reality are intermingled to a greater or
lesser extent. The point of sketching them is to discern
whether, and to what extent, they can be extended to sarto-
rially sequestered persons.
Political solidarity is an action or series of actions de-
rived from an obligation: the duty, as we believe it to be, to
support those who share similar political or quasi-political
values to our own. Socialists are happy to stand by other
socialists who are embattled, whereas they are happy to see
an abundance of liberals and conservatives in total disarray;
and vice versa. Political solidarity is hence a union of like
11 For a more extensive list, and a fivefold classification, of emotions,
see Elster 2007: 148–151.
12 Quoted in Goffman 1963: 93. The statement comes from Simmel’s
Soziologie (1908).
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with like and it is confined to that likeness. We feel political
solidarity for groups to the extent they embody beliefs that
we consider vital—say, of fairness or dignity—or because
their predicament reveals dangers to which we could our-
selves one day be exposed. People committed to constitu-
tional pluralism, for instance, believe that all non-violent
groups of citizens that obey the law are entitled to rights of
participation. When British and West European trade union-
ists supported the Polish trade union and political organiza-
tion Solidarity, during the 1980s, they did so out of the
conviction that workers should support one another when
oppressed by the state (or employers).
While political solidarity is limited to like supporting
like, confined to helping people as citizens or proto-
citizens of a certain persuasion (e.g. liberals not fascists,
political prisoners not political jailors, workers not employ-
ers), social sympathy is potentially boundless and, where it
is not simply emotional, rests on the altruistic principle of
assisting individuals as fellow human beings, irrespective of
their political and other views. Social sympathy is boundless
because the suffering that prompts it is endless. And unlike
political solidarity, social sympathy is deaf to political
antagonisms, credentials and alliances. Social sympathy is
especially sensitive to individuals rather than groups; and
the individuals for whom sympathy tends to be strongest are
children. While political solidarity is principally a matter of
adult responsibilities, nothing is more likely to trigger social
sympathy than the sight of a bedraggled orphan, a crying
stray, an emaciated child, or a young face ravaged by the
horror of war. It is for good reason that humanitarian aid
agencies use such images as their prime advertising tool.
Social sympathy, often shading into pity, is more affec-
tive, more immediate, less detached and less conceptual than
political solidarity (Arendt 1963: 88–89). And while politi-
cal solidarity flags a boundary or marker of exclusion (not
everyone is our ally but only those who share our convic-
tions), social sympathy is infinitely extendable. The sense of
justice that inspires social sympathy is based not on the
requirements of political similarity but on the fulfillment
of personal charity, common decency and elite philanthropy.
Those to whom we tender political solidarity are comrades
and political equals, real or imaginary; those who provoke
social sympathy are the abandoned with whom we have
nothing in common aside from our humanity.
Neither political solidarity nor social sympathy requires
physical proximity. Nor do they require symmetry and rec-
iprocity. A and B may strike up an alliance to assist one
another, generating a vitality that neither party possesses by
itself. Just as often, however, the solidarity afforded by A to
B is never reciprocated by B (South African trade unions
under Apartheid; political prisoners in China and Cuba)
because A, being safe and secure, has no need of reciproca-
tion, and because B lacks the resources ever to “repay”.
Similarly, the gifts of social sympathy are unlikely ever to
occasion gifts in return because their recipients are simply
too poor, too powerless and too geographically distant to
give anything back. The weak are neither expected nor in a
position to shore up the strong.
In sharp contrast, social solidarity derives principally
from face-to-face encounters and it requires reciprocity
and mutual respect for its very existence. Sociology 101
still teaches introductory students to think of social solidar-
ity as the socialization of norms and values that, where
successful, permeate the reflexes of human beings, coordi-
nating their behavior, and committing them to common
moral standards. Or solidarity is said to arise from increas-
ing differentiation, the modern division of labor, whereby
we become dependent on a manifold of people and services
that provide conditions of our existence that we are incapa-
ble of providing for ourselves. These textbook descriptions
are not so much wrong as imprecisely stated or at least
stated in such a way as to mean something different from
social solidarity as the term is used here. Drawing on the
Durkheimian model, we can say that social solidarity is a
mode of cohesion based on mutual recognition of worth and
classificatory congruence. In turn, these properties emerge
out of situations of a special type, namely those that enact
interaction rituals in natural settings. These rituals, more
often spontaneously slipped into than deliberately choreo-
graphed, are ever present in social relations and help create a
common mood centered on common foci of attention. The
more intense the attention, the more concentrated the inter-
subjective awareness of the ritual participants of their com-
mon bond; as awareness increases, so too, does the entrain-
ment of the actors as they fall into a common rhythm of
interactions, and share the “emotional energy” they generate
(Durkheim [1912] 1995; and especially Collins 2004).
Human rituals require co-presence. They may span the
smallest encounter between two people—a greeting at the
office, a joking relationship with a colleague, a marriage
proposal—or larger units such as a sports event or a political
demonstration; during a major crisis, a whole city may
briefly be caught up in the same set of rituals. In each case,
those in contact with one another expect, and themselves
cultivate, a demeanor of respect for the situation and its
participants so as to allow the interaction to proceed smooth-
ly. And ubiquitously, interaction rituals take place within
boundaries of recognition that delineate outsiders in the very
act of soliciting the chosen few and affirming their status.
Those boundaries are marked by totems such as wedding
rings, flags, holy buildings, songs, coins, slogans and other
representations of exclusiveness that remind ritual interac-
tants of past deeds and past promises and arouse commit-
ments to the interactant unit. Despoilment of these totems,
or betrayals of the rituals of group intimacy they signify,
cause anger and aggression. As a local event, a bounded
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interaction among subjects who give each other face and by
so doing find unity in their social commerce, social solidar-
ity is thus also the occasion of conflict between those
granted respect and those denied it, between those in the
“pocket of solidarity,” and those outside it, between those
allowed access to the enclave of valued transactions and
those denied admittance as pariahs or inferiors (Collins ibid:
47–140).
In this context, one sees the difficulty of social solidarity
emerging spontaneously for and with N/B clad women.13 If
is true that “eye-to-eye looks…play a special role in the
communication life of the community, ritually establishing
an avowed openness to verbal statements” (Goffman 1963:
92), then it is also true that N/B, as a materialized collective
representation, is an avowal of closure to familial strangers,
a sharp boundary. The covered woman’s eyes may well be
visible, but covering itself is a disincentive towards meeting
the eyes; a glance must be especially furtive if is not to push
“civil inattention” too far and become offensive. In Goff-
man’s (1963: 38, 92-3) lexicon, the N/B is an “involvement
shield.” As with all such shields, the result is a dilution of
both “richness of information flow” and “facilitation of
feedback” (ibid: 17). More generally, the inability to see
potential interlocutors is a major impediment to drawing
“emotional energy” from them. The sociological irony is
that a garb that signifies the danger of contamination—the
male gaze—may itself be deemed dangerous by strangers
because it represents tribal notions of exclusiveness as con-
trasted to pluralist notions of far-flung reciprocity. Along
these lines, Stefaan Van Hecke, a member of the Belgian
Ecolo-Green! Party, stated in the Chamber of Deputies that
his party had supported the headscarf but that the burqa
“goes too far in our eyes” because it is “a wall that permits
no communication.” He was immediately supported by
Georges Dallemagne of the Democratic Humanist Center
party. “It [the burqa] represents to us a rupture with the
fundamental principle of our society which holds that com-
munication, even of a minimal kind, among the members of
society implies the possibility of seeing the face of the
other” (CRB2 2010: 23–25).
Notice, however, that it is not public covering as such
that creates alienation; it is the meaning that the covering
conveys, together with its permanence. Cities that experi-
ence particularly dangerous epidemic diseases such as the
SARS outbreak in Hong Kong in 2003 witnessed omnipres-
ent mask wearing. But “efface work” (Baehr 2008: 159–
167) in the Hong Kong case shows that while mask wearing
was a signal of repulsion (“don’t get too close to me”) it
acted also as a signal of common courtesy: less a prophy-
lactic against catching the virus than a symbol of deference
for the sensibilities of others, expressing the desire not to
infect them. In this case distance served the purpose of
reciprocity; it was a demeanor that flagged respect. Mask
wearing in these conditions was temporary; it was a re-
sponse to crisis. It was also ubiquitous, rather than being
exclusive to one group. When SARS retreated, the masks
were discarded. The N/B is entirely different. It is a perma-
nent marker of a separation deemed normal.
The Future of “Diversity” Consciousness
It is not irrational for Muslims to wear the N/B where it is
appropriate for a certain kind of life. Nor is it irrational for
such covering to provoke indignation in another ritual order
with diverging norms of appropriateness. However, “diver-
sity” consciousness—the idealization of multiculturalism—
finds such legitimate and rational incommensurability hard
to handle. If two ritual orders are in collision, one of them
must be phobic. We know which one that is.
This article’s exploration of the N/B’s appearance in the
West is limited in many obvious ways. It represents neither
the experiences of covered women in Western lands nor
offers an ethnography of covering practices and native
responses to them—for instance, videotaped behavior of
people in supermarkets, airports and streets. Both tasks are
valuable; the latter, in particular, would be able to test,
qualify and refute some of the claims made above. Equally
this article offers no divination of public opinion polls (the
Pew survey referenced at the beginning of this article did not
ask people why they support a burqa ban), nor does it argue
on the basis of survey data or interviews conducted by the
authors. We offer something else: an enquiry into the polit-
ical and social frameworks that, even in the absence of
hatefulness and prejudice towards Muslims, make the N/B
profoundly dissonant with Western traditions. These tradi-
tions are no less weighty by being historically “con-
structed”. They are the real frameworks, or shards of
frameworks, within which people make sense of the world.
As we have stressed, our principal concern is with what the
N/B controversy reveals about Western structures of thought
and feeling rather than what is says about Muslim women.
Another limitation of the foregoing is that it offers no
definite public policy advice to governments regarding pro-
hibition, no attempt at adjudication to parties involved in the
dispute. This is not a debate on which a sociologist can
deliver authoritative judgment. It is a matter of political
argument, moral choice and, almost inevitably, conflict.
Nor can sociologists ignore legal traditions that play a major
role in defining the rationality or irrationality of a ban. For
French ultra-secularists, banning the N/B makes sense in
13 We are also unlikely to extend political solidarity to those whose
idea of politics is so very different from our own. We are just as
unlikely to feel social sympathy for people who are happy to be as
they are, if they are indeed happy, or who do not request our aid.
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light of France’s republican tradition and civil religion. It
also makes sense given France’s tradition of regarding the
public space as a controlled sphere in which egalitarian
mannerisms and citizenly gestures are not merely a polite
choice but a civic duty, a necessity, backed in constitutional
law by the doctrine of “public order” (Gordon 2008: 47, 52–
53, 63 note 53; Baehr and Gordon 2013; ANRI 2010: 556–
558).
For most Americans, by contrast, prohibition is largely
unthinkable because a) it contradicts the First Amendment
of the Constitution protecting “the free exercise” of religion;
b) Americans fear government regulation more than they do
cultural diversity; and c) the American idea of “religion” is
more generic and inclusive than that of the French. Ameri-
cans rush, in cross-religious solidarity, to faiths that are
embattled, believing that infringement on the liberty of one
confession is potentially a threat to them all (Gordon
2008:48–51). Both the structure of American jurisprudence
and American popular culture work against a burqa ban.
Logic and universal morality (Moralität), on which philos-
ophers and theologians pronounce, is different from situated
ethicality (Sittlichkeit) with which historians and sociolo-
gists are concerned.14 Underpinning that ethicality are legal
systems and popular conceptions of constitutional freedom.
If the burqa controversy reveals more about what is
important to Western traditions than it does about Muslim
women, it also raises vital questions. These are questions
about the rights of groups to organize their own collective
life; questions about the responsibilities of the state to pro-
tect individuals within groups who are oppressed by them;
questions about the indispensable nature of basic forms of
citizenly, face-to-face comportment in a democracy; and
questions about whether the state can legitimately require
citizens to be communicative and reciprocal with each other,
or whether the minima of transparency are a matter of
choice. The burqa is at the edge of solidarity. It may be
deemed a symbolic harm to democracy, or as a basic civil
right. But the burqa controversy is certainly more than an
expression of Islamophobia. It is a predicament requiring us
to articulate our democratic conceptions with uncustomary
precision. And no matter which policy we choose, to ban or
not to ban, it requires us to recognize the antimonies of
democratic existence, and to sacrifice some goods for the
sake of protecting others.
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